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Research on African American racial identity has utilized 2 distinct approaches. The
mainstream approach hasfocused on universal properties associated with ethnic and
racial identities. In contrast, the underground approach hasfocused on documenting
the qualitative meaning of being African American, with an emphasis on the unique
cultural and historical experiences of African Americans. The Multidimensional
Model ofRacial Identity (MMRI) represents a synthesis of the strengths of these two
approaches. The underlying assumptions associated with the model are explored. The
modelproposes 4 dimensions ofAfrican American racial identity: salience, centrality,
regard, and ideology. A description of these dimensions is provided along with a
discussion ofhow they interact to influence behavior at the level ofthe event. We argue
that the MMRI has the potential to make contributions to traditional research
objectives of both approaches, as well as to provide the impetus to explore new
questions.
African Americans' experiences in the United States
differ significantly from those of members of other
ethnic groups. Although many ethnic groups have ex-
perienced discrimination and oppression in the United
States, the form of oppression that African Americans
have faced is unique. While the worthiness of other
ethnic groups has often been questioned upon their
arrival in American society, no other groups' humanity
was denied them by the U.S. Constitution. African
Americans were defined legally as property by the
United States government for almost a century. For
nearly 100 years after the end of slavery, laws were
enacted with the expressed purpose of making social
contact between Whites and African Americans illegal.
Such laws effectively relegated African Americans to
the status of second-class citizens. Because they were
brought to the United States against their will and
systematically deprived of access to their indigenous
culture, African Americans were not afforded the
choice of whether to assimilate into the new culture or
retain their indigenous culture. As a result, traditional
African culture has had to be grafted onto the cultural
practices of the European/American society to form an
original cultural expression. The African American
celebration of Kwanza is a good example of this union.
As a result of their experiences with oppression in
this society, the concept of race has historically played
a major role in the lives of African Americans. Al-
though race has dubious value as a scientific classifica-
tion system, it has had real consequences for the life
experiences and life opportunities of African Ameri-
cans in the United States. Race is a socially constructed
concept which is the defining characteristic for African
American group membership. This does not deny the
importance of both traditional African and African
American culture in the phenomenon of racial identity
in African Americans. However, American society's
somewhat arbitrary categorization of individuals into
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this racial group has resulted in the psychological uni-
fication of many individuals who vary a great deal in
their experiences and cultural expressions. The fact that
the experiences of African Americans are heterogene-
ous has resulted in variability in the significance and
qualitative meaning that they attribute to being a mem-
ber of the Black racial group. For instance, some indi-
viduals place little significance on race in defining who
they are, while others may see their racial membership
as the defining characteristic of their self-concept. Even
when individuals place similarly high levels of signifi-
cance on race in defining themselves, they may differ a
great deal in what they believe it means to be Black.'
One individual may believe that being Black means
congregating among other Blacks, while another may
believe being Black means that one should integrate
with Whites. It is the significance and meaning that
African Americans place on race in defining themselves
2that we refer to as racial identity.
In this article, we introduce a new model of African
American racial identity-the Multidimensional Model
of Racial Identity (MMRI). This model provides a
conceptual framework for understanding both the sig-
nificance of race in the self-concepts of African Ameri-
cans and the qualitative meanings they attribute to being
members of that racial category. Along with this con-
ceptual framework, we propose a mechanism by which
racial identity influences individuals' situational ap-
praisals and behaviors. Before presenting the model, we
highlight the potential contributions of the MMRI and
place it within its historical context by presenting a brief
historical review of the way in which African American
racial identity has been conceptualized and investigated
in the psychological literature. Next, we discuss how
contemporary researchers have begun to conceptualize
ethnic identity to incorporate both the significance and
the meaning of their ethnic group membership. We will
then describe the four dimensions that comprise the
We purposefully make a distinction in our usage of the terms
Black and African American. The term Black is used as an ambiguous
category that may or may not be inclusive of all persons of African
descent, depending upon the individual's viewpoint. Some African
Americans conceptualize the Black reference group as a group that
is made up of African Americans only. Other African Americans may
hold a more Pan-African view of the Black reference group, in which
anyone of African descent is considered to be Black. Thus, we use
the term Black when referring to the individuals' own pheno-
menological view ofthe make-up of their reference group. In contrast,
we use the term African American to refer to those individuals of
African descent who have received a significant portion of their
socialization in the United States. Thus, the term African American
is culturally bound to a group of people within the context of Ameri-
can society.
Although some researchers have argued against the term racial
identity in favor of the term ethnic identity to describe group identity
within African Americans (e.g., Smith, 1989), we believe the impor-
tance of the concept of race in the experiences of African Americans
makes the former term preferable.
MMRI as well as some preliminary evidence of its
operationalization. Next, we discuss how both the sig-
nificance of race and the meaning of race interact to
influence behavior at both -the molecular and molar
level. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the
contributions of the MMRI to our understanding of
African American racial identity.
Brief History of Racial
Identity Research
Racial identity has been one of the most heavily
researched areas that focuses on the psychological ex-
periences of African Americans. Since its infancy, ra-
cial identity researchers have grappled with the signifi-
cance and meaning of the construct (Cross, 1991).
Much of the early research viewed African American
racial identity within the context of this group's stigma-
tized status in American society, with little regard for
the role of culture (Clark & Clark, 1939; R. Horowitz,
1939). Gaines and Reed (1994, 1995) refer to this
research tradition as the mainstream approach. This
approach primarily has focused on the universal aspects
ofgroup identity, using African Americans as a specific
example. In the late 1960s another group of psycholo-
gists, primarily African Americans, began to redefine
African American racial identity with particular empha-
sis on the uniqueness of their oppression and cultural
experiences. This research constitutes what Gaines and
Reed (1994, 1995) refer to as the underground perspec-
3tive. Although the mainstream approach owes its roots
to the work of Gordon Allport (1954), the underground
approach has a lineage that dates back to the pioneering
work of W. E. B. DuBois (1903).
Initially, Gaines and Reed (1994, 1995) distin-
guished between the mainstream and underground ap-
proaches in their analysis of the research literature on
prejudice. In their analysis, these investigators sug-
gested that the mainstream approach is concerned pri-
marily with examining universal cognitive and affec-
tive processes (biases and errors) to explain how and
why individuals (regardless of race) exhibit prejudicial
behavior. This approach suggests that any group can act
in a prejudicial manner or display in-group bias. In
contrast, the underground (or Afrocentric) approach
emphasizes the historical and cultural factors associated
Gaines and Reed (1994, 1995) use the term underground to
reflect the fact that the research from this approach has traditionally
received relatively little recognition from the broader psychological
community. Like Gaines and Reed, we do not wish to convey
secretiveness or subversive activity when we use the term under-
ground. The researchers within this approach have held a continuing
public discourse regarding their work that has been presented and
published in sources that are available to everyone. The applicability
of the term underground comes from the unfortunate reality that the
scholarship has been virtually ignored by mainstream psychology.
19
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with African Americans' experiences in the United
States. Prejudice is seen as more than an error or bias in
cognitive processing with an associated affective re-
sponse. The underground approach views racial preju-
dice as a by-product of America's history of slavery and
exploitation. Racial prejudice is viewed within the con-
text of the White society's need to resolve the disso-
nance between the high moral ideas that embody being
an American and America's immoral treatment of Af-
rican Americans. In actuality, much of Gaines and
Reed's (1994, 1995) discussion of prejudice focuses on
the differences in Allport and DuBois's conceptualiza-
tion of the identity development of African Americans
in the face of prejudice.
Mainstream Approach to African
American Racial Identity
Allport (1954) maintained that living in a racist
environment must have negative consequences for the
African American psyche. As a result, he assumed that
African Americans were forced to either devalue as-
pects of themselves that reminded them of the stigma
of being African American, or devalue the broader
society for its prejudice against them, in order to func-
tion. This notion of an unhealthy, stigmatized identity
was consistent with the predominant conceptualiza-
tions of the African American self-concept prior to the
late 1960s (Clark, 1965; R. Horowitz, 1939; Kardiner
& Ovesey, 1951). Subsequently, much of the early
research on African American racial identity from the
mainstream perspective presumed that self-hatred was
a significant aspect of the African American self-con-
cept (Cross, 1991).
As the mainstream approach has matured, much of
the focus has been on understanding the cognitive proc-
esses and structures of different group (or social) iden-
tities within the self-concept (e.g., Cheek & Briggs,
1982; Gurin & Markus, 1988; Hogg, 1992; Markus,
1977; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; J. C. Turner &
Oakes, 1989) while ignoring the unique experiences of
each group. For mainstream researchers, racial identity
within African Americans is simply one example of
these processes. The focus has been on assessing the
common psychological structures associated with
group identities of different racial/ethnic groups. Based
on this focus, mainstream researchers tend to employ
measures of group identity that are applicable to mem-
bers of a variety of groups (e.g., Luhtanen & Crocker,
1992; Phinney, 1992). For example, Luhtanen and
Crocker (1992) developed a collective self-esteem scale
that measures individuals' attitudes and feelings about
a group with which they strongly identify. The refer-
ence group individuals choose may be based on race,
gender, ethnicity, region, occupation, or something
else. Presumably, persons' responses to a particular
group are comparable to the responses of another group
they may select or even to other persons' responses to
different groups. Phinney's (1990, 1992) measure of
ethnic identity emphasizes a universal process that is
associated with individuals' development of an ethnic
identity. Phinney de-emphasizes the unique history and
experiences associated which each ethnic group in fa-
vor of promoting a generic model that emphasizes the
similarities across ethnic groups so that comparisons
can be made across them.
The mainstream approach to racial/ethnic identity
has tended to focus on the significance of race or
ethnicity in individual lives. For instance, both Phinney
(1992) and Crocker (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990) have
a concept in their model that deals with the importance
individuals place on their racial/ethnic group member-
ship. Crocker and her colleagues address this dimension
of racial identity with their membership subscale in the
Collective Self-Esteem measure (Luhtanen & Crocker,
1992). Phinney also measures a similar construct in her
Multi-Group Ethnic Identity measure (Phinney, 1992).
To their credit, Crocker and her colleagues distinguish
between the significance of race to an individual's
self-concept and the affective and evaluative feelings
that the individual holds for his or her racial/ethnic
group by delineating a separate construct that they call
private self-esteem. Cross (1991) notes the historical
importance of making such a distinction in investigat-
ing racial identity and self-esteem in African Americans
as some of our recent research on the relationship
between racial identity and self-esteem suggests
(Rowley, Sellers, Chavous, & Smith, in press).
In its focus on universal properties and its emphasis
on the significance of a group identity to an individual,
the mainstream approach also has produced a great deal
of research describing contexts in which a particular
group identity is most likely to be salient (e.g., Abrams,
Thomas, & Hoggs, 1990; Cota & Dion, 1986; Kite,
1992; McGuire & McGuire, 1982; J. C. Turner, Oakes,
Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). Research in self-categori-
zation and social identity suggests that the social con-
text of a particular situation can make various aspects
of an individual's identity more or less accessible to
them (e.g., Abrams et al., 1990; Cota & Dion, 1986;
Kite, 1992; McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujioka,
1978). Distinctiveness theory (McGuire et al., 1978)
states that when one is confronted by a complex stimu-
lus, one notices a given characteristic of the stimulus to
the extent that it is distinctive in the usual environment.
In other words, McGuire and colleagues have consis-
tently found distinctiveness to be relevant in relation to
ethnicity and gender, as well as to a host of other factors
such as age, birthplace, weight, hair color, and eye color
(Kite, 1992; McGuire et al., 1978; McGuire, McGuire,
& Winton, 1979; McGuire & Padawer-Singer, 1976).
The mainstream approach also has provided sub-
stantial evidence that making a group identity salient
20
 at UNIV OF MICHIGAN on August 11, 2014psr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
AFRICAN AMERICAN RACIAL IDENTITY
has consequences for the way in which individuals will
perceive persons who are outside of their group (e.g.,
Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Crocker & Major, 1989;
Crocker & Swartz, 1985; Jackson & Sullivan, 1987;
McCall & Simmons, 1978). When the context is ma-
nipulated to make group membership salient, individu-
als are likely to evaluate fellow members of their group
more favorably than individuals outside their group.
They are also likely to devalue members of the out-
group. Membership in a stigmatized group also influ-
ences the way individuals interpret negative feedback
(Crocker & Major, 1989). Members of a stigmatized
group are more likely to attribute negative feedback to
prejudice than others in situations in which such an
attribution is reasonable. Such external attributions
seem to serve a protective function for the self-esteem
(Crocker & Major, 1989).
As a whole, the mainstream approach has produced
a significant body of research delineating the underly-
ing structure of identity for different groups. However,
in producing this important information, this approach
has, until recently, placed very little attention on the
qualitative meanings associated with particular ethnic
and racial identity. As a result, the mainstream ap-
proach has provided a view of African American racial
identity that has emphasized the stigma associated with
having African features in this society. In some in-
stances, mainstream researchers have acknowledged
the protective qualities associated with African Ameri-
can racial identity (e.g., Crocker & Major, 1989), but
even this acknowledgment is based on a view of Afri-
can American racial identity that focuses on the stigma
attached to the identity, as opposed to the experiential
properties associated with the unique historical and
cultural influences associated with the African Ameri-
can experience.
Underground Approach to African
American Racial Identity
In contrast to Allport, DuBois (1903) did not view
the African American self-concept as necessarily being
damaged. Although he felt that the racial oppression
African Americans faced played a significant role in the
development of their self-concepts, he also recognized
that there were cultural influences that had a direct
positive influence on African American ego develop-
ment. Thus, DuBois recognized that African Americans
could forge a healthy, strong self-concept even with the
stigma of being devalued by the larger society. From
these theoretical roots, the underground approach to
racial identity developed. As noted earlier, some main-
stream research has recognized that racism has not
resulted in systematic self-hatred in African Americans
(e.g., Crocker & Major, 1989); however, there is a clear
difference between the two approaches in the emphasis
that is placed on the role that history and culture play in
the qualitative and experiential meaning associated
with being Black.
The underground perspective emphasizes the speci-
ficity ofAfrican American racial identity. The focus has
been on providing a description of what it means to be
Black. In other words, the underground approach has
provided identity profiles regarding individuals' atti-
tudes and beliefs associated with their membership in
the Black race. These profiles may differ as a function
of identity development (Cross, 1971, 1991; Milliones,
1976; Parham, 1989) or exposure to a nurturing so-
ciocultural environment (Baldwin, 1984; Kambon,
1992). Nonetheless, an optimal set of beliefs and atti-
tudes regarding one's race are either implicitly or ex-
plicitly stated. Researchers differ in their criteria for
determining what constitutes an optimal identity. This
criteria ranges from an ability to survive in a racist
environment (Parham, 1989) to a biogenetically prede-
termined state of identity (Baldwin, 1984; Kambon,
1992).
DuBois (1903) eloquently articulated the double
consciousness that resulted from the inherent struggle
of being both a "Negro" and an American. Because of
the inherent conflict between America's overwhelm-
ingly negative view of the Negro and the Negro's own
view of him or herself, the essential task of healthy ego
development in African Americans becomes the rec-
onciliation of the discrepancy between his or her Afri-
can self and his or her American self. Not surprisingly,
the tension between the individual's "blackness" and
the broader White society plays a central role in the
way theorists from the underground perspective at-
tempt to define the meaning of being Black. However,
there is great variability in the way that this tension is
conceptualized in definitions of what it means to be
Black. Some theorists view identification with one's
blackness and identification with the broader White
society as being two separate endpoints on a single
continuum (e.g., Baldwin, 1984). Others view them as
two separate dimensions on which individuals fall
(e.g., Boykin, 1983). Still others conceptualize excep-
tionally strong identification with all things Black as
being an important step within the process of develop-
ing an integrated identity (e.g., Cross, 1991). Theorists
from the underground approach also recognize that the
meaning of being Black is not only influenced by
experiences of racism, but also incorporates cultural
experiences from African Americans' historical and
contemporary experiences in America and Africa (e.g.,
Azibo, 1989; Baldwin, 1980, 1984; Cross, 1971,1991;
Kambon, 1992; Milliones, 1976; Smith, 1991; J. L.
White & Parham, 1990). As a result, many Afrocentric
theorists consider it to be inappropriate to use models
based on the experiences of other ethnic groups to
explain the experiences of African Americans (Akbar,
1984; Azibo, 1991; Baldwin, 1984).
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Perhaps the most widely used model of African
American racial identity within the underground per-
spective is Cross's model of Nigrescence (Cross, 1971,
1991). The Nigrescence model describes five stages of
racial identity development that African Americans
experience as they develop a psychologically healthy
Black identity (Cross, 1971, 1991; Helms, 1990;
Parham, 1989). Although the model has been adapted
to investigate the group identities of members of other
groups, the Nigrescence model was originally proposed
to describe the unique cultural and structural experi-
ences associated with becoming Black in the United
States (Cross, 197 1). Recently, Cross (1991) revised the
model and broadened each stage to include more di-
verse experiences. Briefly, in the first stage, preencoun-
ter, individuals do not believe that race is an important
component of their identity. This may include an ide-
alization of the dominant White society or simple place-
ment of more emphasis on another identity component
such as gender or religion. Individuals in the second
stage, encounter, are faced with a profound experience
or a collection of events directly linked to their race.
This experience encourages individuals to reexamine
their current identity and find or further develop their
Black identity. This experience can be either positive
or negative (Cross, 1991). The third stage, immer-
sion/emersion, is described as being extremely pro-
Black and antiwhite. Externally, individuals are ob-
sessed with identifying with Black culture, but
internally they have not made the commitment to en-
dorse all values and traditions associated with being
Black. The fourth stage, internalization, is charac-
terized by having a feeling of inner security and satis-
faction about being Black. Moreover, individuals at this
stage tend to have a less idealized view regarding the
meaning of race. They are able to see both the positive
and negative elements of being Black or White. Inter-
nalization-commitment, the final stage, represents those
individuals who translate their internalized identities
into action.
Parham and Helms (1981) developed the Racial
Identity Attitudes Scale (RIAS) to operationalize the
Nigrescence model. The RIAS measures attitudes that
are representative of attitudes individuals are likely to
hold toward the self, Blacks, and Whites as they trans-
verse through the four stages. Attitudes are predicted to
change from antiblack or low race salience (preencoun-
ter); to attitude flux (encounter); to pro-Black with
reference to antiwhite attitudes (immersion-emersion);
to pro-Black without reference to White attitudes. The
latest version of the RIAS is a 50-item scale in which
respondents use a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) to
indicate the extent to which each item represents their
attitudes (Helms & Parham, 1990). There has been
some concern regarding the reliability of the subscales
(Ponterotto & Wise, 1987), and some authors have
questioned whether the use of an attitude scale is able
to capture the complexity of African American racial
identity (Akbar, 1989).
Whereas the mainstream approach has focused pri-
marily on questions regarding the internal validity of
the identity processes, the underground approach has
been primarily concerned with exploring the predictive
validity of their models. For example, much of the
research using the RIAS has investigated the correlation
between individuals' scores on the four subscales of the
RIAS and such phenomena as demographic back-
ground (Parham & Williams, 1993), attitudes regarding
utilizing counseling services (Austin, Carter, & Vaux,
1990; Helms, 1984; Parham & Helms, 1981), self-ac-
tualization (Parham & Helms, 1985), and ego function-
ing (Marriette, 1990). Meanwhile, relatively little em-
pirical research has directly investigated the processes
proposed in the Nigrescence model (Sellers, 1993).
Little longitudinal research has been produced that
demonstrates the validity of the concept of individuals'
cycling through the four stages proposed by the model.
Similarly, much ofthe research using Baldwin's (1984)
African Self-Consciousness model has focused on its
ability to predict Afrocentric-related behavior and atti-
tudes to the neglect of research questions regarding the
underlying assumptions of the model (e.g., Baldwin,
Brown, & Rackley, 1990; Baldwin, Duncan, & Bell,
1987; Baldwin & Hopkins, 1990). Thus, the under-
ground approach has produced research that has pro-
vided relatively strong evidence that the meaning that
African Americans hold for their racial identity plays
an important part in their lives but has generated rela-
tively little empirical evidence supporting the existence
of the internal processes and structures proposed in their
conceptual models.
The mainstream perspective and the underground
perspective provide very different views of African
American racial identity. While there is some overlap
between the two perspectives, the two approaches differ
in the types of research questions, methodologies, and
results they have yielded. The mainstream approach,
with its focus on process and structure, provides a
framework through which African American racial
identity can be viewed in the context of other identities
individuals may possess. Meanwhile, the underground
approach provides a framework for studying the cul-
tural and experiential influences which comprise the
qualitative aspects of African American identity. It also
provides a metric in which to understand individual
differences in the level of identification with the group.
It is obvious that the two approaches to studying
group identity are more complementary than contradic-
tory. Because they have different foci, an integration of
the two approaches provides an opportunity to generate
a more comprehensive understanding of African
American racial identity than either approach could
provide alone. We attempted to achieve such an inte-
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gration by introducing the Multidimensional Model of
Racial Identity (MMRI). The MMRI represents an
amalgamation ofa number ofexisting theories on group
identity that is sensitive to the historical and cultural
experiences that make racial identity a unique form of
group identity for African Americans.
Assumptions of the MMRI
In her review of the adult ethnic identity research,
Phinney (1990) noted that nearly two-thirds of the
studies failed to define racial or ethnic identity explic-
itly. The MMRI defines racial identity in African
Americans as the significance and qualitative meaning
that individuals attribute to their membership within the
Black racial group within their self-concepts. This defi-
nition can be broken into two questions: "How impor-
tant is race in the individual's perception of self?", and
"What does it mean to be a member of this racial
group?" The MMRI attempts to address these ques-
tions.
With these questions in mind, four assumptions un-
dergird the MMRI. Unlike the assumptions underlying
some underground models (Kambon, 1992), these as-
sumptions are all testable, thereby providing a means
by which to assess the validity of the conceptual model
(see Sellers, 1993). First, the MMRI assumes that iden-
tities are situationally influenced as well as being stable
properties of the person. Some theorists have argued
that the selfmay be a situationally determined construct
(J. C. Turner et al., 1994), whereas other researchers
have focused on the stable properties of identity
(Markus, 1977; Swann & Read, 1981). The MMRI
takes a position similar to that of Stryker and other
identity theorists in that identity has both properties
(Markus& Kunda, 1986; Stryker& Serpe, 1982,1994).
Specifically, racial identity in African Americans has
dynamic properties that are susceptible to contextual
cues and allow the stable properties of the identity to
influence behavior at the level of the specific event. At
the same time, there are also stable properties of racial
identity that allow us to see differences in the qualitative
value and significance individuals place on the role race
plays in how they define themselves. These stable quali-
ties of racial identity are not immutable. They may
gradually change throughout the life span as a result of
a cumulative influence of the social environment and/or
developmental forces. More intense situations or expe-
riences such as those characterized by the encounter
stage of the Nigrescence theory may also result in
lasting changes in the significance and meaning of race
in an individual's life (Cross, 1971, 1991).
A second assumption of the MMRI is that individu-
als have a number of different identities and that these
identities are hierarchically ordered (Markus & Sentis,
1982; McCall & Simmons, 1978; McCrae & Costa,
1988; Rosenberg, 1979; Stryker & Serpe, 1982; 1994).
Although a number ofdifferent criteria can be identified
in the literature as placing various identities within a
hierarchy (McCall & Simmons, 1978; Rosenberg,
1979; Stryker & Serpe, 1994), the MMRI uses criteria
that are most consistent with those used by Rosenberg
(1979). In examining the hierarchy of identities, the
MMRI focuses on the importance that the individual
places on race in defining him or herself. By explicitly
conceptualizing racial identity as only one of many
identities within the self-concept, the MMRI provides
the opportunity to investigate race within the context of
other identities such as gender and occupational iden-
tity. The relative importance of race compared to other
identities may have important implications for the
qualitative meaning that a person ascribes to being
African American. For instance, an African American
woman for whom both gender and race are important
to her definition of self is more likely to incorporate
gender in her conceptualization of what it means to be
Black than an African American woman for whom
gender is not a central aspect of her identity.
A third assumption of the MMRI is that individuals'
perception of their racial identity is the most valid
indicator of their identity. Although the MMRI recog-
nizes the role that societal forces plays in shaping the
self, the emphasis is clearly on the individual's con-
struction of his or her identity. Thus, the MMRI takes
a phenomenological approach toward studying racial
identity that focuses on the person's self-perceptions
(Jones & Gerard, 1967; Weiner, 1974). Some re-
searchers have chosen to focus on behavioral indicators
over subjective perceptions ofthe self as a less contami-
nated approach to understanding the self (Stryker &
Serpe, 1994; R. Turner, 1978). Because the MMRI is,
by definition, interested in the individual's own percep-
tions of the significance of race in his or her own
definition of self, behavioral indicators are less desir-
able than the person's self-report. This does not mean
that we expect no relationship between self-reported
perceptions and overt behavior. For the most part, race-
related behaviors and activities should be highly corre-
lated with the person's subjective beliefs about the
importance of race in their self-concept (Phinney,
1992). However, because overt behavior associated
with a particular identity is also constrained by contex-
tual factors (Stryker & Serpe, 1982), it is not a perfect
indicator of the importance an individual places on that
identity.
TheMMRI also emphasizes the individual's percep-
tion of what it means to be Black. No a priori definition
is provided. The MMRI recognizes that there are indi-
vidual differences in the qualitative nature of the mean-
ing individuals ascribe to being a member of the Black
racial group. Similarly, the MMRI makes no value
judgment as to what constitutes a healthy versus an
unhealthy racial identity. In order to ask whether a
particular identity is either good or bad, one must decide
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upon criteria by which to base one's evaluation. In order
to avoid tautology, it is important that the outcome be
distinct from the phenomenon being evaluated. In this
case, the MMRI represents an assessment of each indi-
vidual's racial identity (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).
Certain identities may be associated with more positive
outcomes (higher self-esteem, psychological well-be-
ing) than others. However, these are empirical ques-
tions regarding associations between two separate phe-
nomena. The MMRI does not propose that any identity
is, in and of itself, good or bad. It is important that any
evaluation of racial identity takes into consideration the
ecological environment associated with the identity
before evaluating its adaptiveness. It is quite likely that
the adaptiveness of particular identities are a function
of both the environment and the phenomena used to
evaluate adaptiveness.
Finally, the MMRI is primarily concerned with the
status of an individual's racial identity as opposed to its
development. The MMRI focuses on the significance
and the nature of an individual's racial identity at a
given point in time in the individual's life as opposed
to placing an individual in a particular stage along a
particular developmental sequence. In this way, the
MMRI differs from developmental models of racial
identity such as those proposed by Cross (1971, 1991),
Phinney (1992), and Milliones (1980). The difference
in emphasis does not place the MMRI in direct conflict
with these models; instead it provides a potential com-
plement. As noted above, the MMRI allows for the fact
that the significance and the meaning that individuals
place on race are likely to change across their life span.
Developmental models characterize individuals' racial
identity according to where they reside on these devel-
opmental trajectories, while the MMRI provides a ru-
bric from which to describe the significance and mean-
ing of race at various points along the developmental
trajectory. Using the MMRI along with some of the
existing developmental models could help validate the
assumptions associated with both approaches and pro-
vide a more comprehensive understanding of the nature
and development of racial identity in African Ameri-
cans.
Dimensions of the MMRI
Racial Identity
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of the multidimensional
model of racial identity.
ideology refer to the individuals' perceptions of what it
means to be Black (see Figure 1).
Salience. Racial salience refers to the extent to
which one's race is a relevant part of one's self-concept
at a particular moment or in a particular situation. Thus,
racial salience is concerned with the particular event or
situation as the unit of analysis.4 It is highly sensitive to
both the context of the situation and one's proclivity to
define oneself in terms of race (McCall & Simmons,
1978; Rosenberg, 1979; J. C. Turner et al., 1994). Our
conceptualization of salience is consistent with Markus
and Nurius's (1986) conceptualization of the working
self-concept and the notion ofspontaneous self-concept
(e.g., Cota & Dion, 1986; McCrae & Costa, 1988;
McGuire et al., 1978; McGuire & Padawer-Singer,
1976). For instance, Markus and Nurius (1986) suggest
that there is a working self-concept that contains a set
of self-conceptions that are presently active in thought
and memory. They argue that identity within the work-
ing self-concept at any moment is determined by the
core identity and the immediate social context. Thus,
the probability that race may be salient varies across
both individuals and situations (Gurin & Markus,
1988). In general, individual differences in racial sali-
ence become more evident in more ambiguous situ-
ations as a result of individual differences in the more
stable characteristics of racial identity (centrality). For
example, being the only African American in an all-
With these assumptions as its foundation, the MMRI
proposes four dimensions of racial identity that address
both the significance and the qualitative meaning of
race in the self-concepts of African Americans. These
four dimensions consist of: racial salience, the central-
ity of the identity, the regard in which the person holds
the group associated with the identity, and the ideology
associated with the identity. Racial salience and cen-
trality refer to the significance that individuals attach to
race in defining themselves; while racial regard and
The concept of salience is discussed throughout the identity
literature (e.g., Cross, 1991; Rosenberg, 1979; Stryker, 1980; Stryker
& Serpe, 1982, 1994; White & Burke, 1987). In these instances the
term has been used to describe the normative importance of an
identity to an individual. For instance, Stryker has used the term to
describe the probability a particular identity can come into play in a
given situation (Stryker, 1980; Stryker & Serpe, 1982). Such a
trans-situational property is more consistent with our conceptualiza-
tion of centrality. Our conceptualization of salience is more closely
akin to that espoused by McCall and Simmons (1978) in which the
event is the unit of analysis and salience is considered to be influenced
in part by situational cues.
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White restaurant may make race salient for one African
American, while it may not affect another African
American in the same situation. More stable person
characteristics, specifically racial centrality, may direct
individuals to pay attention to certain cues within the
social event and direct attention away from others. On
the other hand, some situations are so persuasive that
they make race salient for almost all African Ameri-
cans. That is, it is highly likely that race would be salient
for any African American sitting in the middle of a Ku
Klux Klan meeting, instead of a restaurant.
Racial salience is the mediating process between the
more stable characteristics of identity and the way
individuals construe and behave in specific situations.
Studies of in-group bias have consistently shown that
making group identities salient (even arbitrary identi-
ties) has consequences for the way in which individuals
evaluate and behave towards members of both the
in-group and out-group (for review, see Messick &
Mackie, 1989). Similarly, the extent to which race is
made salient in a particular situation also has an impact
on the way that the person construes the situation. In
our previous restaurant example, the person for whom
race is salient may construe poor service from a White
waitress as being the result of possible racism, while the
other person is more likely to attribute it to some other
factor (such as the waitress is always unfriendly). These
construals have very different implications regarding
the potential behavior of the two African American
customers. Thus, understanding whether race is salient
is important in predicting how the two African Ameri-
can customers will respond in a given situation.
Salience is a process variable in that it is a function
of both situational cues and person factors (specifically
centrality). As such, it is very similar to Lazarus and
Folkman's (1984) conceptualization of appraisal in the
stress and coping literature. One can not understand
salience as being simply the product of the situation and
the person. The combination of these two sets of factors
results in a third variable that is completely different
from the original set of factors. For instance, neither
hydrogen nor oxygen alone are water. They only become
water when they are combined in specific combination.
It is impossible to determine from looking at or tasting
water what part is hydrogen and what part is oxygen. As
a result of the influence of situational cues, salience is
very dynamic and can change from event to event. As a
result of person factors, there are also likely to be indi-
vidual differences in salience within the same event.
Centrality. Racial centrality refers to the extent
to which a person normatively defines himself or her-
self with regard to race. Unlike salience, centrality is,
by definition, relatively stable across situations. The
unit of analysis for centrality is not a particular event,
but instead the individual's normative perceptions of
self with respect to race across a number of different
situations. Also, implicit in the conceptualization of
centrality is a hierarchical ranking of different identities
relative to their proximity to the individual's core defi-
nition of self (Banaji & Prentice, 1994; Gurin &
Markus, 1988). For example, some African American
women may define themselves more in terms of their
gender than their race, while others may use race as the
more important self-defining characteristic. The con-
cept of centrality is at the core of many of the existing
research models of group, social, racial, and ethnic
identity.
Personal construct theory (Kelly, 1955) argues that
people define the world and themselves based on dif-
ferent constructs which are idiosyncratic to themselves.
The theory argues that certain constructs are more rele-
vant (superordinate) and others are less relevant (sub-
ordinate) to how a person views the world or them-
selves. In personal construct terms, central identities are
analogous to superordinate self-constructs and noncen-
tral identities are considered subordinate self-constructs
(Ingram, 1989). A critical feature of both the conceptu-
alization of centrality and personal construct theory is
its reliance on a phenomenological perspective in de-
termining whether race is central to a person's identity.
Cross (1991) discusses some of the limitations of stud-
ies which ascribe a certain racial identity to a person
based on their membership within a racial classification
when attempting to investigate the relationship between
identity and some other outcome. Such ascribed identi-
ties do not fully incorporate the individual differences
in the meaning and relevance of race in the lives of the
persons within these racial classifications and as a result
obtain inaccurate estimates of the relationship between
identity and outcome.
A few researchers from the mainstream perspective
have proposed concepts similar to centrality. Luhtanen
and Crocker (1992) have incorporated such a concept
in their measure of collective self-esteem. This measure
includes a 4-item subscale entitled "identity," which
measures the person's perceived importance of her or
his membership within a specific group. At present, this
aspect of their measure has been underutilized and
underemphasized. Phinney's (1992) Multigroup Ethnic
Identity Measure also includes items tapping a person' s
feelings of belonging and attachment to one's ethnic
group within the Affirmation and Belonging subscale.
These concepts are somewhat related to racial central-
ity. Unfortunately, these racial centrality items are in-
termingled with items that tap individuals' evaluative
attitudes towards their ethnic group. As such, the
subscale seems to tap two separate constructs at the
same time.
Historically, centrality has played a leading role in
the underground approach to African American racial
identity. Many of these models are based on the explicit
assumption that race is a very central identity in a
25
 at UNIV OF MICHIGAN on August 11, 2014psr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
SELLERS, SMITH, SHELTON, ROWLEY, & CHAVOUS
normally functioning African American (Akbar, 1981;
Baldwin, 1984; Baldwin, Brown, Rackley, 1990; Kam-
bon, 1992). As such, the extent to which race is a central
identity has been viewed as an indicator of the status of
individuals' racial identity development as well as their
mental health. For example, Baldwin's (1984; also
known as Kobi Kambon) model argues that all indi-
viduals of African descent are biogenetically predis-
posed toward a central racial identity when nourished
in a nonhostile and affirming environment (Kambon,
1992). Baldwin argues that African personality consists
of two core systems. The first is the African Self-Ex-
tension Orientation (ASEO), which is biogenetically
determined and resides in all people of African descent.
The ASEO is hypothesized to be an unconscious core
system that warehouses the collective spiritual essence
of all African people. The second is a conscious system
termed the African Self-Consciousness (ASC), which
transforms the ASEO through the individual's life cy-
cle. As a conscious process, ASC is believed to be
influenced by both the environment and by biogenetics.
Variation in environmental experiences that are cultur-
ally affirming lead to individual differences in levels of
ASC, such that individuals in a more culturally affirm-
ing environment are likely to have higher levels ofASC
(Baldwin, 1984; Baldwin, Brown, & Rackley, 1990;
Kambon, 1992).
Although some theorists have assumed that race is
most central, empirical research suggests that race is not
always a central aspect of many African Americans'
self-concept (Ingram, 1989; Phinney & Alipuria, 1990).
Ingram (1989) used the Role Construct Repertory Grid
to assess the meaningfulness of various self-constructs
in a predominantly female (72%) sample of African
American college students. She found that although
participants rated race as a meaningful self-construct,
gender was rated as the most meaningful construct.
Phinney and Alipuria (1990) asked participants to rate
five identity domains (occupation, politics, religion,
gender role, and ethnicity) on a 4-point scale ranging
from 1 (not at all important) to 4 (very important). Their
results revealed that ethnic identity tied for third place
with religious identity among the African American
participants in their sample. In fact, some researchers
have even begun to suggest that having a less central
racial identity may be more adaptive for African Ameri-
cans (Penn, Gaines, & Phillips, 1993). Unfortunately,
there is a dearth of studies that have empirically inves-
tigated the relation between racial centrality in African
Americans and mental health status (Sellers, 1993).
Those few studies that have attempted to assess such a
relation have been limited by measures ofcentrality that
are confounded with other aspects of racial identity
(e.g., Parham & Helms, 1985). Thus, it is imperative
that the significance of race in individuals' self-con-
cepts be conceptualized and operationalized distinctly
from other aspects of racial identity.
Whereas the salience and centrality dimensions of
the MMRI address the question of the significance of
race in individuals' lives, the regard and ideology di-
mensions address the question of the meaning that
individuals attribute to being Black. As such, these two
dimensions attempt to capture some of the texture and
richness associated with African American racial iden-
tity that flows from the heterogeneity within the Black
experience.
Regard. Feelings of positivity and negativity to-
wards being Black has been a consistent theme in the
research literature on African Americans. As Cross
(1991) points out, much of the early work on African
American racial identity viewed preference for one's
own group as instrumental in the conceptualization of
racial identity (e.g., Clark & Clark, 1947; E. L.
Horowitz, 1936; R. Horowitz, 1939). African American
children's preference for White stimuli (such as dolls)
was seen as evidence of African American adults' de-
valuation of their race which in turn was explained away
as the natural consequence of African Americans inter-
nalizing the broader society's negative view of them
(Cross, 1991). Later, researchers from the underground
perspective also placed a great deal of emphasis on
individuals' evaluations of Blacks in their models of
African American racial identity (e.g., Baldwin, 1984).
They tended to conceptualize positive feelings towards
Blacks as being an essential component of a healthy
racial identity. In any event, individuals' evaluations of
Blacks as a group have historically been conceptualized
as an important component of African American racial
identity.
We attempt to address this theme ofgroup evaluation
within the MMRI via our conceptualization of the re-
gard dimension. Racial regard refers to a person's
affective and evaluative judgment of her or his race in
terms of positive-negative valence. In other words, it is
the extent to which the individual feels positively about
his or her race. This conceptualization of racial regard
is based heavily on Crocker and her colleagues' work
on collective self-esteem (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990;
Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine, & Broadnax, 1994; Crocker
& Major, 1989; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). Like their
model of collective self-esteem, our regard dimension
consists of both a private and a public component.
Private regard is defined as the extent to which indi-
viduals feel positively or negatively towards African
Americans as well as how positively or negatively they
feel about being an African American. This component
of regard is also consistent with the concept of psycho-
logical closeness and racial pride in other models (e.g.,
Demo & Hughes, 1990; Hughes & Demo, 1989).
Public regard is defined as the extent to which
individuals feel that others view African Americans
positively or negatively. It is the individual's assess-
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ments of how his group is viewed (or valued) by the
broader society. Researchers from both the mainstream
and underground perspectives have argued that the
concept of public regard plays an important part in the
way in which African Americans identify with their
own group. The mainstream approach has generally
argued that the devaluation of African Americans by
the broader society should have a deleterious influence
on individuals' evaluation of their own group (R.
Horowitz, 1939; Kardiner & Ovesey, 1951; Lewin,
1936, 1941; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992; Mead, 1934;
Stryker, 1980; C. L. White & Burke, 1987). As such,
much of the mainstream research has implicitly sug-
gested that having a public regard that recognizes the
broader society's devaluing of ones group (stigmatiz-
ing) should most likely lead to a more negative evalu-
ation of that group (private regard).
In contrast, much of the research from the under-
ground approach has argued that understanding and
acknowledging the oppression that African Americans
continue to face is an important step in the development
of a healthy African American racial identity (e.g.,
Baldwin & Bell, 1985; Parham & Helms, 1981; Terrell
& Terrell, 1981). As such, the underground perspective
tends to place much less emphasis on the broader soci-
ety's ability to imprint its attitudes regarding African
Americans on African Americans. The underground
perspective has been quicker to recognize the cultural
factors-such as the African American family, church,
and community-that may moderate these messages
from the mainstream (e.g., Broman, Jackson, & Neigh-
bors, 1989; McAdoo, 1985). In fact, many of the models
have argued that understanding that the broader society
devalues African Americans (as a result of racism)
helps to keep African Americans from internalizing
those negative messages regarding their worth.
Unfortunately, research testing these opposing pre-
dictions is scarce because researchers have failed to
operationally define the concepts of private and public
regard independently. In one of the only studies to
measure both private and public regard independently,
Crocker et al. (1994) used a race-specific version of
their Collective Self-Esteem Scale (CSES) to assess the
relation between the different components of this scale
for a sample of African American, White, and Asian
American college students. For the African American
students, private race-specific CSES (private regard)
was not correlated with public race-specific CSES
(public regard). Interestingly, the public and private
race-specific CSES scores were significantly positively
correlated for both White and Asian American students.
Although Crocker and her associates' (Crocker et al.,
1994) findings of no significant relation between pri-
vate and public regard does not support either the
mainstream or the underground perspectives view, the
differences in the correlations between the African
Americans and the other two groups reinforce the view
that it is important to study African American identity
within its own cultural and historical context.
Ideology. The fourth dimension of the MMRI,
ideology, is composed of the individual's beliefs, opin-
ions, and attitudes with respect to the way she or he feels
that the members of the race should act. This dimension
represents the person's philosophy about the ways in
which African Americans should live and interact with
society. Based on our reading of the research literature
and exposure to African American culture, we have
delineated four ideological philosophies which seem to
be prevalent: (a) a nationalist philosophy, (b) an op-
pressed minority philosophy, (c) an assimilation phi-
losophy, and (d) a humanist philosophy. These four
ideologies are manifested across four areas of function-
ing consisting of individuals' attitudes with respect to:
(a) political/economic development, (b) cultural/social
activities, (c) intergroup relations, and (d) perceptions
of the dominant group. Although a person can be cate-
gorized as possessing a particular ideology, it is likely
that most people hold a variety of philosophies that
often vary across areas of functioning. For example, a
person could believe that African Americans should
primarily patronize African American owned busi-
nesses (nationalist) and at the same time feel that Afri-
can Americans should integrate White institutions (as-
similation).
The nationalist ideology stresses the uniqueness of
being Black. As such, the nationalist person views the
African American experience as being different from
that of any other group. A nationalist ideology posits
that African Americans should be in control of their
own destiny with minimal input from other groups.
Thus, with respect to issues of social change, a person
with a nationalistic perspective is more likely to partici-
pate in African American organizations. A nationalist
ideology can evolve as a mechanism of resistance to the
marginalized status that African Americans have in this
society (Parham, 1989). A nationalist ideology can also
grow out of a deep appreciation and awareness of the
culture and accomplishments of African Americans. In
many instances, individuals' nationalist philosophies
are developed as a result of both experiences. A nation-
alist ideology is also associated with a preference for
African American (or African) social environments.
Some of the underground models have viewed a nation-
alist ideology as being the optimal Black identity (Bald-
win, 1984), while others (Cross, 1991) suggest that
ultranationalistic attitudes may be characteristic of a
racial identity which has not fully developed. As noted
earlier, the MMRI places no inherent value in the extent
to which one endorses a nationalist ideology.
The oppressed minority ideology emphasizes the
similarities between the oppression that African Ameri-
cans face and that of other groups. Like the nationalist
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ideology, individuals who espouse this philosophy are
acutely aware of the oppression that continues to con-
front African Americans. However, the oppressed mi-
nority ideology sees a link between the oppression that
African Americans face and that of other minority
groups. The model allows these minority groups to
differ according to the individual. For some individuals,
other oppressed groups with whom they identify as
minority may consist of women, gay men, and lesbians;
others may define minorities as only consisting of eth-
nic groups of color. In any case, an individual endorsing
the oppressed minority ideology is more likely to view
coalition building as the most appropriate strategy for
social change. From an intellectual standpoint, indi-
viduals with an oppressed minority ideology are often
interested in the nature of oppression. From a cultural
perspective, these individuals are as interested in the
culture of other minority groups as they are their own.
The assimilationist ideology is characterized by an
emphasis on the similarities between African Ameri-
cans and the rest of American society. A person with an
assimilationist ideology acknowledges his or her status
as an American and attempts to enter, as much as
possible, into the mainstream. An assimilationist ideol-
ogy does not necessarily imply a de-emphasis in the
importance of being African American, nor does it
necessarily imply a lack of recognition of racism in
America. A person with an assimilationist ideology can
be an activist for social change; however, he or she is
likely to feel that African Americans need to work
within the system to change it. Interpersonally, persons
with an assimilation ideology are more likely to believe
it to be important to interact socially with Whites. The
underground approach has often viewed an assimila-
tionist ideology as being symptomatic of the earliest
stages of identity development (Cross, 1971; Parham &
Helms, 1985) and even pathological (Kambon, 1992).
Our model makes no such assumption. An assimilation
ideology may represent for the individual a means to an
end or it may represent an end in itself.
Finally, the humanist ideology emphasizes the simi-
larities among all humans. Persons with a humanist
viewpoint do not think in terms of race, gender, class,
or other distinguishing characteristics. They are likely
to view everyone as belonging to the same race-the
human race. A humanist ideology is often concerned
more with "larger" issues facing the human race (such
as the environment, peace, and hunger). Oppression is
seen in terms of "man's inhumanity towards man."
Thus, humanists are likely to emphasize the moral
detriments of oppression for the oppressor as well as the
physical and psychological consequences it has for the
oppressed. Individuals with a humanist ideology see
race as being of only minor importance with respect to
the way that they lead their lives (low centrality) and
view the world. As a result, they are more likely to
emphasize the characteristics of the individual person,
regardless of race. Penn et al. (1993) have argued that
an ideology that de-emphasizes race is representative
of the highest level of identity development. Interest-
ingly, Cross's revised model suggests that a humanist
ideology may be consistent with both the earliest
(preencounter) and the latest (internalization) stages of
identity development (Cross, 1991).
Racial identity is a complex component of the Afri-
can American self-concept. The MMRI does not con-
sider any of the four dimensions to be synonymous with
racial identity, just as the individual's arm is not syn-
onymous with his or her whole body. The dimensions
simply represent different ways in which racial identity
is manifested. It should be noted that different dimen-
sions of racial identity are related to different behavioral
and adaptational outcomes. Researchers should choose
the dimension of racial identity that they study based
on the goals of their research. Relatedly, racial identity
should not be seen as a panacea. There are many behav-
ioral and adaptational outcomes that are not related to
racial identity.
Mechanism by Which Racial Identity
Influences Behavior
The processes by which individuals' beliefs regard-
ing the meaning and significance of race can influence
the way in which they appraise and behave in specific
events has not been delineated in the current literature
on racial identity. The MMRI attempts to address this
oversight through the conceptualization of salience and
its relation to constructs in the construct accessibility
literature. Numerous studies have demonstrated that the
construct that is most accessible to the person during a
particular event is the construct most likely to be used
in judgments of behavior or impression formation in
that particular event (Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota,
1986; Bargh, Lombardi, & Higgins, 1988; Bargh &
Pietromonaco, 1982; Bargh & Pratto, 1986; Bargh &
Thein, 1985; Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982; Higgins,
Rholes, & Jones, 1977). Higgins (1989, 1990) deline-
ates two forms of accessibility in describing the ways
in which a construct may become accessible in a par-
ticular event. A temporarily accessible construct be-
comes accessible as a result of recent contextual or
situational factors, while a chronically accessible con-
struct is one that has a high probability of becoming
accessible in any situation. Chronically accessible con-
structs develop out of each person' s unique life history
of social encounters. They develop from frequent ex-
perience with a specific domain of social behavior
related to the construct. A construct can be both tem-
porarily accessible and chronically accessible in a situ-
ation in which both the situational cues and the person's
proclivity towards a particular construct point to the
same construct.
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The salience and centrality dimensions of the MMRI
are consistent with the conceptualization of construct
accessibility. Individuals' regard and ideology beliefs
represent constructs about the meaning of being Black.
Salience and centrality represent the accessibility of the
regard and ideology constructs. Salience is consistent
with the concept of accessibility in a particular event.
Race may become salient (accessible) in a particular
event as a function of situational factors, making it
similar to Higgin's (1989) notion of temporary acces-
sibility. However, race may also be salient in a particu-
lar event as a result of an individual' s proclivity for race
to become salient (centrality or chronic accessibility).
In general, both the situational cues and the personal
proclivity interact to influence the salience or accessi-
bility of race.
Other research has shown that when certain con-
structs are made accessible the content of these con-
structs are better predictors of individuals behaviors in
specific situations than when the constructs are not
accessible (see Fazio, 1986, 1990; Fazio & Zanna,
1981, for reviews). Fazio's (1990) review of the litera-
ture notes the ubiquity of the impact of accessibility of
a construct on the person's subsequent behavior in a
situation. Although Fazio acknowledges that an attitude
can be activated because of situational, or more inher-
ent, personality factors, he suggests that how the atti-
tude is activated is less important than the fact that the
attitude is activated or becomes accessible to the indi-
vidual. The more accessible an individual's attitude
toward an object, the more likely it is that the individual
will behave in a way that is consistent with the attitude.
The activation of the attitude encourages individuals to
appraise the situation in ways that are consistent with
the attitude. Interestingly, the majority of the work on
the moderating effect of attitude accessibility on the
relation between attitudes and behavior focuses primar-
ily on attitudes toward objects or other people, not
attitudes about the self. However, Markus's (1983;
Markus & Sentis, 1982) conceptualization of self-
knowledge suggests that the moderating effect of acces-
sibility can be applied towards attitudes individuals
have about the self. That is, information individuals
have about the self influences behavior most when this
information is most relevant to the individual's self-
concept.
Individuals' regard and ideology beliefs are attitudes
about the meaning of being Black and as such they
should influence individuals' behavior during specific
events in a manner that is consistent with the attitudes
that have been traditionally measured in the research
literature on attitude accessibility. Specifically, regard
and ideology beliefs should have a greater influence on
individuals' behavior at the level of the event when race
is more salient than when it is less salient. This suggests
a process by which the content of an individuals racial
identity (ideology and regard beliefs) may influence
behavior at the level of the situation (see Figure 2).
Situational cues and centrality interact to determine the
extent to which race is made salient during a particular
event. The level of race salience in a particular event
then moderates the extent to which the individual's
ideology and regard beliefs influence their interpreta-
tion of the event as well as their subsequent behavior
within the event.
The centrality of a particular role/identity has been
found to be associated with the performance of behav-
iors that are indicative of that particular role/identity
(e.g., Stryker & Serpe, 1982). However, this research
has focused primarily on roles/identities for which there
is a consensus within society regarding the meaning of
the role/identity. As noted above, the historical experi-
ences of African Americans have led to a great deal of
variability in the qualitative meaning that African
Americans attribute to being Black. As a result, indi-
viduals may vary in the way that they behave in a
particular situation as a function of differences in the
level at which race is salient and/or as a function of
differences in the qualitative meaning that they ascribe
to being Black (ideology and regard). Thus, two indi-
viduals with similar ideology and regard beliefs may
behave differently in the same situation because one is
Figure 2. The process by which racial identity influences behavior at the level of the event.
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interpreting the situation through the lens of his racial
identity because it has been made salient, while the
other person may be interpreting the situation through
some other identity lens because race is not salient to
them in this situation. Similarly, two individuals in the
same situation for whom race is equally salient may also
behave differently because the two individuals may
differ with respect to the content of their racial identity
schema (ideology and regard beliefs).
The conceptualization of the salience dimension is
critical to the-delineation of a process by which the
stable dimensions of racial ideology may influence
behavior. Salience provides an important bridge be-
tween the molar level of analysis and the molecular
level of analysis. The conceptualization of salience
allows for the delineation of a process that accounts for
the heterogeneity in individuals' responses to particular
events, while at the same time provides specific predic-
tions about an individual's behavior when information
is known about the situational cues regarding race, as
well as the significance and meaning that the individual
attributes to being Black.
While salience is critical to our understanding of the
relation between the content of the individual's racial
identity and his or her behavior at the level of a particular
event, centrality is also critical to our understanding of
the relation between racial identity and trans-situational
behavior or phenomena. The term trans-situational phe-
nomena refers to behavior and attitudes that are a result
of individuals' actions and thoughts across a number of
situations. Examples of trans-situational phenomena in-
clude things such as grade point average (GPA), global
self-esteem, trait anxiety, and life satisfaction. Trans-si-
tuational phenomena are more likely to be influenced by
racial regard and ideology attitudes when an individual's
racial identity plays an important role in how he or she
defines himself or herself normatively across events.
Individuals may hold attitudes about any group in which
they belong, but those attitudes are only going to be
self-diagnostic if the identity itself is self-relevant. For
instance, an individual may have feelings about his
social security number. He may be able to tell you which
numbers he likes and which ones he dislikes. However,
knowing that information tells us nothing about the way
that the individual feels unless the individual defines
himself or herself in terms of his or her social security
number. As noted previously, African Americans differ
in the level of significance race plays in their self-con-
cept. That individual difference in the significance of
race influences the extent to which the qualitative mean-
ing that they ascribe to being Black impacts their behav-
ior at the molar level.
Our research program has found consistent evidence
that an individual's level of centrality moderates the
relation between his or her beliefs regarding the mean-
ing of race (regard and ideology) and trans-situational
behavior or phenomena. In a study examining the rela-
tions among centrality, private regard, and personal
self-esteem, we found a significant moderating effect
for centrality (Rowley et al., in press). For individuals
who were low in racial centrality, there was no relation
between how positively they felt about Black people
(private regard) and their personal self-esteem. For
individuals who were high in racial centrality, however,
a positive relation was found between private regard
and personal self-esteem. Similarly, centrality moder-
ated the relation between racial ideology and college
GPA (Sellers, Chavous, & Cooke, in press). Once
again, for individuals for whom race was not a central
identity, there was no relation between their racial
ideology and GPA. For individuals for whom race was
central, however, there were significant relations be-
tween three of the ideology subdimensions (i.e., minor-
ity, nationalist, and assimilation) and GPA. Thus, al-
though individuals may have beliefs regarding what it
means to be Black, these beliefs are going to be diag-
nostic only when the individual sees being Black as an
important part of who they are.
Operationalization of the Multidimensional
Model of Racial Identity
In order to operationalize the MMRI, we developed
the Multidimensional Inventory of Black Identity
(MIBI). In developing the MIBI, we adapted items from
previous identity scales as well as developed items on
our own. The MIBI is comprised of 3 scales that meas-
ure the centrality, ideology, and regard dimensions. The
Ideology Scale also consists of4 subscales (Nationalist,
Assimilation, Minority, and Humanist), and the Regard
Scale consists of 2 subscales (Private Regard and Public
Regard). The sensitivity of Salience to context cues and
its dynamic nature makes its operationalization via a
questionnaire instrument problematic. Racial salience
is best measured using experimental and quasi-experi-
mental methods in which the effects of the social con-
text are either manipulated or measured (Shelton &
Sellers, 1996). Thus, the MMRI is amenable to a mul-
timethod approach to studying racial identity.
Preliminary analyses suggest that the MIBI is a valid
and reliable measure of the MMRI (Sellers, Rowley,
Chavous, Shelton, & Smith, 1997). A sample of 474
African American college students from two universi-
ties (one predominately White American and one pre-
dominately African American) was used to evaluate the
reliability and validity of the MIBI. Using factor analy-
ses, we found evidence in strong support of a Centrality
Scale and four ideology subscales that was consistent
with the MMRI. The Centrality and Ideology Scales
yielded acceptable alpha coefficients (as range from .70
to .79) for the examination of both predictive and
construct validation (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). The
evidence for the internal validity of the Private Regard
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subscale was modest (cx = .60) and the Public Regard
subscale was weak (cc = .20). Recently, we revised a
number of items to the Regard Scale that has resulted
in two scales that are both internally consistent (Private
Regard ax = .78; Public Regard a = .78). Factor analysis
with a sample of African American college students
found the revised Regard subscales to be distinguish-
able from each other and the Centrality Scale. The
revised Regard subscales were also highly correlated
with the previous Regard subscales (Public Regard r =
.87, Private Regard r = .87).
We have also found evidence of the predictive va-
lidity of the MIBI (Sellers, Rowley, et al., 1997).
Subscales of the MIBI demonstrated significant rela-
tions with the amount of contact individuals reported
with Blacks and with Whites. Specifically, individuals
with a Black best friend scored higher on the Centrality
and Nationalist scales and lower on the Assimilation,
Humanist, and Minority ideology scales. Centrality,
Private Regard, and Nationalist scores were positively
associated with contact with Blacks, while Centrality
and Nationalist scores were negatively associated with
contact with Whites. (See the Appendix for items that
comprise the MIBI.)
Shelton and Sellers (1996) conducted a study in
which gender and racial identity were manipulated
within a sample of African American college women to
investigate the influence of situational factors on racial
identity salience and the stable dimensions of the
MMRI. The identities were manipulated by altering the
content of a video recording as well as the racial and
gender composition of the group with which the student
viewed the recording. Our conceptualization of salience
suggests that it is a function of both situational factors
and individuals' level of centrality. Shelton and Sellers
found strong evidence that centrality influenced iden-
tity salience in race- and gender-ambiguous conditions.
There was also moderate evidence that the situation
manipulations influenced individuals' racial identity
salience. Finally, individuals' scores on the MIBI taken
8 weeks prior to their participation in the study did not
change as a function of the situation manipulations
(including the race-salient condition). These findings
suggest that the MMRI has properties that are both
situationally dynamic and cross-situationally stable.
These preliminary findings are promising. They sug-
gest that the MMRI can be operationalized in a valid
and reliable manner. However, more research is needed
before the full impact of the MMRI can be assessed.
Potential Contributions of the MMRI
A potential strength of the MMRI is that it attempts
to combine the strengths of both the mainstream and
underground approaches to studying African American
racial identity. In essence, the MMRI provides an inte-
grated framework in which to investigate the structure
and properties associated with the functioning of Afri-
can American racial identity within its own unique
historical and cultural experience. Despite our attempt
to develop an integrative framework, it is also important
to demonstrate how the MMRI makes contributions
above the current models of ethnic/racial identity. In
comparing the MMRI with two of the most popular
mainstream models, Crocker's Collective Self-Esteem
model and Phinney's Model of Ethnic Identity, a major
contribution of theMMRI is its ability to provide a more
textured view of the meaning of being Black as a result
of its being developed within the context of the unique
experiences associated with African American history.
Neither the Collective Self-Esteem model nor Phin-
ney's Model of Ethnic Identity does justice to the rich
heterogeneity in the meaning that African Americans
attribute to being Black. This limitation can be illus-
trated in the models' inability to discriminate between
the identity beliefs of two such diverse African Ameri-
cans as Martin Luther King and Malcolm X.
An examination of the racial identity beliefs es-
poused by Martin and Malcolm in the context of Luh-
tanen and Crocker's (1992) Collective Self-Esteem
Scale (CSES) demonstrates its limitations. Both Martin
and Malcolm viewed race as being central to their
self-concept; thus they would have scored high on the
identity subscale of the CSES. Both individuals viewed
other groups as holding negative views about Blacks,
thus scoring low on the Public Collective Self-Esteem
subscale of the CSES. Both held positive beliefs about
Blacks (scoring high on the Private Collective Self-Es-
teem subscale of the CSES), and both Martin and Mal-
colm felt positively about being Black (high score on
the Membership subscale of the CSES). Despite the fact
that the Collective Self-Esteem model has components
that are similar to two dimensions of the MMRI (cen-
trality and regard), the model does not capture diversity
in the way in which they defined what it means to be
Black.'
Similarly, if one examines the racial identity beliefs
espoused by Martin and Malcolm using Phinney's
(1992) Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM),
we also see some of the limitations of the model in
describing the content of these individuals' racial iden-
tity. Both Martin and Malcolm searched and committed
to a racial identity (high score on the identity Achieve-
ment subscale of the MEIM). Both individuals engaged
in a number of activities and organizations that involved
primarily African Americans (high score on the Ethnic
Behaviors subscale of the MEIM). Both Martin and
Malcolm had a strong attachment and pride in being
5Our conceptualization of the Regard dimension is based heavily
on Crocker and Luhtanen's (1990) conceptualization of Collective
Self-Esteem. However, our conceptualization of centrality was de-
rived from the work of a number of identity models found in both the
mainstream and the underground literatures.
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Black, thus scoring high on the Affirmation and Be-
longing subscale ofthe MEIM. One aspect ofthe MEIM
in which the two may have differed may have been on
the Self-Identification tasks. But this difference would
have depended on the point in Martin's adult life at
which he would have been surveyed. At the time of his
death, Martin is likely to have used the term Black, just
as Malcolm used when he died three years earlier.
Nonetheless it is clear that the MEIM also fails to
capture something important about the racial or ethnic
identities of these individuals.
It should be noted that neither Crocker nor Phinney
make claims that their models address the unique cul-
tural experiences associated with a particular group.
Instead, both researchers have focused on the similarities
associated with group identification. Thus, much of their
research has looked at this phenomenon across groups
(e.g., Crocker et al., 1994; Phinney, 1989; Phinney &
Alipuria, 1990). It is also interesting to note that Crocker
and Phinney developed their models based on previous
work on aspects of the individual-personal self-esteem
(Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990) and ego identity develop-
ment (Phinney, 1989), respectively. The genesis ofthese
models may also account for the de-emphasis on the rich
heterogeneity within identities in favor ofa more general
view of identity. Both the self-esteem literature and
Erickson's (1968) ego identity literature has focused
primarily on stigma to the exclusion of culture in its
investigation of African Americans.
On the other hand, an examination of Martin and
Malcolm in the context of the MMRI allows for both
the similarities and the important differences in the way
in which they viewed being African Americans. As
noted previously, both Martin and Malcolm were high
race central. Both individuals also were high in private
regard and felt that others had negative beliefs about
Blacks (low public regard). A major difference between
the two individuals' self-definitions about what it
means to Black is captured in the ideology dimension.
In general, Martin's political and economic beliefs were
more assimilationist according to the MMRI, while
Malcolm's political and economic beliefs were more
nationalist. An even more textured view of the two
using the MMRI would suggest that Malcolm's ideol-
ogy regarding social interaction went from more nation-
alist views as a member of the Nation of Islam to more
humanist after his trip to Mecca. Meanwhile, Martin's
ideology regarding social interaction seems to have
remained somewhat humanist throughout his adult life.
An analysis of one's ideology beliefs becomes more
complex and detailed as one begins to take more life
domains into consideration. Although other aspects of
African American racial identity are important predic-
tors of different phenomena, it is clear that, without a
dimension like ideology, one's view of individual Af-
rican American's racial identity would be overly sim-
plistic and incomplete.
The lack of texture in the identity profiles of African
Americans also has implications for one's ability to
make predictions about behavior. Without a more com-
plex view of individuals' beliefs about the meaning of
race, we are limited in the types of behavioral predic-
tions we are able to make. For instance, much of the
research on in-group bias has focused on the way in
which individuals treat members of their group as well
as the out-group. The examination of this treatment is
always based on a positive-negative valence. This re-
search has been very important in our understanding of
group processes associated with stigma, favoritism, and
discrimination. However, such approaches are severely
limited in their applicability to our understanding of
African American racial identity because they do not
take into consideration the meaning that individuals
attribute to their group membership. (In the minimal
group paradigm, the goal is to develop groups for which
individuals have no rational reasons to attach meaning.)
Unless one is willing to consider that African American
racial identity is composed simply of a stigmatized
status and a membership in a salient group, then we are
missing something important about racial identity.
Conceptualizing African American racial identity in
such a way greatly limits our ability to capture the
richness of the experience associated with the identity
as well as our ability to make predictions about any but
the most circumscribed behaviors. For instance, such a
conceptualization makes it impossible to explain why
one African American may feel most comfortable at an
opera, another may feel more comfortable at a rap
concert, and a third may feel most comfortable at a salsa
party, while still another African American may feel
equally comfortable in all three situations.
In providing a framework for examining both the
significance and meaning of being Black, the MMRI
has the potential to make important contributions to the
underground approach. At present, much of the re-
search from the underground perspective summarizes
African American racial identity along a single dimen-
sion (e.g., Baldwin, 1984). In so doing, many of the
models have failed to capture the diversity of experi-
ence in the African American community or have
pathologized those experiences that do not fit with the
author's conceptualization of racial identity. The
MMRI provides three different dimensions that can be
used to develop profiles of individuals' racial identity.
Such profiles may be compatible with other under-
ground models that focus on the development of racial
identity (Cross, 199 1; Milliones, 1980). At present, it is
an open question whether certain identity profiles are
associated with different stages of identity develop-
ment. The MMRI also expands the underground ap-
proach's current descriptive focus by providing a
framework for documenting the role of racial identity
within the self-concept. As such, researchers from both
approaches can begin to examine how different group
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identities within an individual's self-concept interact
and affect his or her experiences. Too often racial
identity is studied within a vacuum. Racial identity is
likely to interact with other identities within the self-
concept in such a way as to change its meaning for the
person. For instance, it is quite possible that African
American women's racial ideology may vary according
to the ideologies associated with their gender identity.
There may even be gender differences in racial ideology
as a result of differences in the meaning of gender for
African American men and women. These are testable
research questions within the framework of the MMRI.
Another contribution of the MMRI is in the way it
addresses what constitutes the optimal racial identity.
The underground perspective has argued that the indi-
vidual's perceptions with regard to the meaning of
being African American are a function of both the
person's unique culture and his or her experiences as
a member of an oppressed group (e.g., Akbar, 1984;
Cross, 1991; Kambon, 1992; Milliones, 1980; Nobles,
1991). As a result, underground models have tended to
employ methodologies that are sensitive to the individ-
ual differences in African American identity. How-
ever, in describing the diversity of the meaning of
being African American, most theorists and re-
searchers have attempted to define what constitutes the
optimum African American racial identity. Unfortu-
nately, many of these definitions of the optimum iden-
tity are based on untested and/or untestable assump-
tions and criteria (Sellers, 1993). In some instances, the
criteria used to determine the optimum identity are so
confounded with the measures of identity themselves
that the model itself becomes hopelessly unfalsifiable
(e.g., Kambon, 1992).
In our conceptualization of racial identity, we do not
propose any hierarchy with respect to the inherent value
of any particular ideology. Any evaluation of the func-
tionality of a particular ideology differs according to
which criterion is used to define functionality. For
example, a person who values the survival of African
American culture as a unique and separate way of life
may be more likely to see a nationalist ideology as being
optimal. On the other hand, a person who values the
acceptance of African Americans by the broader
American society may view an assimilationist ideology
as being optimal. Even if consensus existed on a crite-
rion (such as psychological well-being) to be used to
determine an optimal ideology, it is likely that such a
definition would have to be environmentally specific.
Different environments are likely to be more hospitable
for different racial ideologies which may, in turn, con-
tribute to different levels of well-being. For instance, a
nationalist ideology is probably more likely to be asso-
ciated with positive well-being in an all-African Ameri-
can environment than in an all-White environment. In
any event, our conceptualization of ideology allows
researchers to test such a hypothesis.
The MMRI also has the potential to contribute to the
extensive literature on stereotyping. It has been noted
that the stereotype literature has tended to focus on
those who hold stereotypes with relatively little atten-
tion being paid to the effects of such stereotypes on the
stigmatized group (Devine, Evett, & Vasquez-Suson,
1996). Recently, Steele and his colleagues have pro-
posed a model of stereotype threat which suggests that
members of a stigmatized group are vulnerable to per-
formance deficits in tasks for which their group is
stereotyped as being inferior (Steele, 1997; Steele &
Aronson, 1995). Steele and Aronson (1995) have re-
ported evidence that African American college students
performed poorer on a reading comprehension task
when their race was made salient to them. They suggest
that it does not matter whether the person believes the
stereotype; what is important is that the person knows
that the stereotype exists. In their description of stereo-
type threat, Steele and Aronson do not discuss whether
all African Americans would be susceptible or what
factors might lead to individual differences to vulner-
ability to the effect. The MMRI suggests that the mean-
ing and significance that the individual places on race
may moderate the stereotype threat effect. In particular,
individuals who are more race central may need fewer
race cues in the environment for race to become more
salient during a particular task. As a result, they may be
more susceptible to such an effect. However, this effect
may also be moderated by the extent to which the
individual believes that other groups hold those nega-
tive stereotypes about the group (public regard). A
person who does not believe that others hold such
stereotypes may be less vulnerable to the effect. Finally,
it is still an open question as to whether a person's own
beliefs about whether African Americans are less capa-
ble on a task will influence the stereotype threat effect.
In sum, the MMRI has the potential to further explicate
person characteristics which may result in greater dif-
ferentiation in the impact of stereotype threat on the
performance of African Americans.
Perhaps the most important contribution of the
MMRI is that it delineates a process by which racial
identity may influence behavior at the level of the event
through its conceptualization of racial identity. This
issue is one that has been overlooked by both the
mainstream and the underground literatures. Previously
racial identity has been linked primarily to trans-situ-
ational phenomena (e.g., self-esteem, GPA). While
such studies have provided useful information regard-
ing what outcomes racial identity is related to, these
studies have been unable to delineate how racial identity
is related to these outcomes. Because trans-situational
phenomena are comprised of a number of individual
events, one must be able to examine racial identity at
the level of the specific situation. Without a process
variable such as salience, one is forced to assume that
all individuals in the situation will have the same level
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of race salience in the situation. Such an assumption is
only tenable during events where the situational cues
are so strong that they overpower any individual differ-
ences in centrality (e.g., Klu Klux Klan meeting). How-
ever, the vast majority of events are ones in which there
is some ambiguity with respect to the situational cues
that are present. In such situations, we expect individual
differences in levels of race salience. The concept of
salience allows us to account for that individual differ-
ence in our assessment of behavior. As a result, we are
able to make more precise predictions and account for
a greater amount of the variance in our measurement
models of the relation between racial identity and be-
havior at the level of the event.
Racial Identity Versus Identity of
Racial Groups
Recently, a number of mainstream researchers also
have begun to explore the content of the identities of
members of ethnic minority groups (Deaux, 1993;
Ethier & Deaux, 1990, 1994; Gurin, Hurtado, & Peng,
1994; Oyserman, Gant, & Ager, 1995). This research
suggests that ethnic minorities have rich-i sophisticated
notions of self that are not homogenous. Identity in
ethnic minority members is influenced by their social
context (Deaux, 1993; Oyserman et al., 1995), as well
as other social structures such as nativity (Gurin et al.,
1994), to produce unique conceptualizations of the
self. For instance, Gurin and her colleagues examined
the differences in the way in which a sample of Mexi-
cano and a sample of Chicano respondents described
themselves as individuals. They define Mexicanos as
Spanish-dominant persons born in Mexico and Chica-
nos as English-dominant persons born in the United
States. The respondents chose all the cards that de-
scribed them from a set of 32 cards with labels covering
a variety of ethnic, familial, cultural, class, and color
terms. Using confirmatory factor analysis, Gurin et al.
(1994) found that Chicanos demonstrated more differ-
entiated identities (greater number of factors) than the
Mexicanos. The content of the Chicano identities con-
sisted of such factors as Farmworker, Working Class,
U.S./Middle Class, Binational, Latino, Political Raza,
and Family, while the content of the Mexicanos con-
sisted of such factors as Working Class, Middle Class,
Binational, Panraza, and Family Cultural Identifica-
tion.
However, there is an important distinction between
this research and the underground approach to under-
standing racial identity in African Americans. The
former research has focused on the content of identities
of individuals who are members of particular ethnic
and racial groups. Findings from these studies provide
information about the way that individuals in particular
ethnic and racial groups construct their own personal
self-concepts with their race and/or ethnicity as a back-
drop. As such, this approach takes into consideration
not only membership in their ethnic group, but other
group and personal identities that are central to the way
that each individual views him or herself (e.g., class,
family). Thus, the focus of this work is on the "self-con-
cepts" of members of particular ethnic and racial
groups.
In contrast, researchers within the underground
approach have tended to focus more on the meaning
of being a member of a particular group-Blacks.
The individual's identification with his or her mem-
bership in the Black group is the only group identity
that is relevant. In most instances, the researchers
provide an a priori definition of what it means to be
Black and the individual's level of racial identity is
assessed according to that definition. Other group
and personal identities that the individual may pos-
sess are not seen as particularly relevant. This is, in
part, because many of the underground approaches to
Black identity implicitly assert that a strong identifi-
cation with race is a necessary part of a healthy Black
identity and that the emphasis of another group iden-
tity over one's racial group is unhealthy (Baldwin,
1984). Thus, the underground approach to studying
racial identity is concerned solely with that aspect of
African Americans' self-concept that is associated
with their race.
The conceptualization of the MMRI is more consis-
tent with the tradition of the underground approach. The
MMRI is concerned with African Americans' attitudes
and beliefs associated with their membership in the
Black racial group. The MMRI does not address di-
rectly the content of African Americans' self-concept
outside of the significance and meaning the individual
attaches to being Black. This does not mean that the
MMRI is incompatible with a more multidetermined
view of the African American self-concept. On the
contrary, we believe that African Americans' beliefs
about what it means to be Black can play a significant
role in shaping their self-concepts if they view race as
a defining characteristic (Rowley et al., in press).
Whereas research such as that produced by Gurin and
her colleagues (Gurin et al., 1994) take a macro view of
the various identity components found in the self-con-
cepts of members of ethnic groups, the MMRI repre-
sents a micro view of a particular identity component
within the self-concept of African Americans. Thus,
research on the content of the self-concept of African
Americans can provide breadth to our understanding of
what identity components play a role in the self-con-
cepts of African Americans, while research from the
underground perspective (including the MMRI) can
provide important information about the depth of a
particular identity dimension. Both are needed for a
comprehensive, textured, and layered understanding of
the self-concepts of African Americans.
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The Generalizability of the
MMRI to Other Groups
The extent to which the MMRI can serve as a meta-
framework for examining other group identities (such
as ethnicity and gender) is open to debate. Because the
MMRI integrates ideas from the mainstream approach,
certain aspects of the model may be applicable to other
group identities. In particular, the structure and the
processes of group identity may be similar across
groups. For example, much of the mainstream literature
has reported evidence of the existence of identity sali-
ence and centrality for identities other than African
American racial identity (e.g., Cota & Dion, 1986;
Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992; Markus & Nurius, 1986;
McCrae & Costa, 1988; McGuire et al., 1978). Salience
and centrality appear to be general cognitive processes
that are not confined to any one identity. Thus, in a fairly
gender-ambiguous situation, we would predict that gen-
der is likely to be more salient for a woman for whom
gender is a highly central aspect of her identity than for
a woman for whom gender is less central. However, the
qualitative meaning of these identities are likely to
differ according to the historical experiences associated
with the group.
Thus, it is imperative that any application of the
MMRI to other groups only be done after a careful
assessment of the model's compatibility with the his-
torical and cultural experiences of the group in question.
The four ideologies delineated by the MMRI are based
specifically on our extensive study of the unique cul-
tural and historical experiences of African Americans.
Although the issues of assimilation and nationalism are
relevant to other ethnic groups, there is a qualitative
difference in the historical significance that these vari-
ous philosophies have for different ethnic groups. For
instance, there may be less tension around issues of
assimilation for ethnic groups who have migrated to the
United States looking for a better life as opposed to
those who had American culture forced on them. Also,
there may be group differences in the way that various
ideologies are interrelated for various groups. There
may be unique ideological profiles for African Ameri-
cans based on their experiences. Similarly, the interre-
lation between the dimensions and other aspects of the
self may also differ across groups as a result of the
qualitative differences in the experiences of the groups.
Rowley et al. (in press) have found evidence that the
relation between public regard and personal self-esteem
does not seem to be important for African Americans,
while research with other ethnic groups suggests that
such a relation is important (Crocker et al., 1994).
Conclusions
The MMRI is an integration of the mainstream and
underground approaches. The MMRI has borrowed
ideas from the mainstream perspective (e.g., concerning
the role of racial identity in the context of other identi-
ties within the self-concept) and merged them with the
underground approach's emphasis on the qualitative
meaning of being Black. As a result, the MMRI is both
"prescriptive" in proposing hypotheses for potential
research questions regarding the structure and dynam-
ics of racial identity in the self-concepts of African
Americans and "descriptive" in proposing relevant di-
mensions in which to illustrate the complexity and
variability that African Americans ascribe to being
Black. It also has the potential to serve as a conceptual
framework that could be adapted with care to the study
of other group identities. In sum, the MMRI provides a
vehicle for addressing new questions regarding African
American racial identity that can contribute signifi-
cantly to both the underground and mainstream ap-
proaches.
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Appendix: The Multidimensional
Inventory of Black Identity
Centrality Scale'
1. Overall, being Black has very little to do with
how I feel about myself. (R)
2. In general, being Black is an important part of
my self-image.
3. My destiny is tied to the destiny of other Black
people.
4. Being Black is unimportant to my sense of what
kind of person I am. (R)
5. I have a strong sense of belonging to Black
people.
6. I have a strong attachment to other Black peo-
ple.
7. Being Black is an important reflection of who I
am.
8. Being Black is not a major factor in my social
relationships. (R)
Regard Scalea
Private Regard Subscale
1. I feel good about Black people.
2. I am happy that I am Black.
3. I feel that Blacks have made major accomplish-
ments and advancements.
4. I often regret that I am Black. (R)
5.
6.
I am proud to be Black.
I feel that the Black community has made valu-
able contributions to this society.
Public Regard Subscale
1. Overall, Blacks are considered good by others.
2. In general, others respect Black people.
3. Most people consider Blacks, on the average, to
be more ineffective than other racial groups. (R)
4. Blacks are not respected by the broader society.
(R)
5. In general, other groups view Blacks in a posi-
tive manner.
6. Society views Black people as an asset.
a(R) items should be reverse coded.
Ideology Scale
Assimilation Subscale
1. Blacks who espouse separatism are as racist as
White people who also espouse separatism.
2. A sign of progress is that Blacks are in the
mainstream of America more than ever before.
3. Because America is predominantly White, it is
important that Blacks go to White schools so
that they can gain experience interacting with
Whites.
4. Blacks should strive to be full members of the
American political system.
5. Blacks should try to work within the system to
achieve their political and economic goals.
6. Blacks should strive to integrate all institutions
which are segregated.
7. Blacks should feel free to interact socially with
White people.
8. Blacks should view themselves as being Ameri-
cans first and foremost.
9. The plight of Blacks in America will improve
only when Blacks are in important positions
within the system.
Humanist Subscale
1. Black values should not be inconsistent with
human values.
2. Blacks should have the choice to marry interra-
cially.
3. Blacks and Whites have more commonalties
than differences.
4. Black people should not consider race when
buying art or selecting a book to read.
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5. Blacks would be better off if they were more
concerned with the problems facing all people
than just focusing on Black issues.
6. Being an individual is more important than
identifying oneself as Black.
7. We are all children of a higher being, therefore,
we should love people of all races.
8. Blacks should judge Whites as individuals and
not as members of the White race.
9. People regardless of their race have strengths
and limitations.
Oppressed Minority Subscale
1. The same forces which have led to the oppres-
sion of Blacks have also led to the oppression
of other groups.
2. The struggle for Black liberation in America
should be closely related to the struggle of other
oppressed groups.
3. Blacks should learn about the oppression of
other groups.
4. Black people should treat other oppressed peo-
ple as allies.
5. The racism Blacks have experienced is similar
to that of other minority groups.
6. There are other people who experience racial
injustice and indignities similar to Black Ameri-
cans.
7. Blacks will be more successful in achieving
their goals if they form coalitions with other
oppressed groups.
8. Blacks should try to become friends with people
from other oppressed groups.
9. The dominant society devalues anything not
White male oriented.
Nationalist Subscale
1. It is important for Black people to surround their
children with Black art, music and literature.
2. Black people should not marry interracially.
3. Blacks would be better off if they adopted Afro-
centric values.
4. Black students are better off going to schools
that are controlled and organized by Blacks.
5. Black people must organize themselves into a
separate Black political force.
6. Whenever possible, Blacks should buy from
other Black businesses.
7. A thorough knowledge of Black history is very
important for Blacks today.
8. Blacks and Whites can never live in true har-
mony because of racial differences.
9. White people can never be trusted where Blacks
are concerned.
Note: Response scale ranges from 1 (Strongly Dis-
agree) to 7 (Strongly Agree).
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